certain mental illnesses. Recent evidence suggests that the work disincentive effects of disability benefits are expected to be larger during period of reduced stringency in screening since moral hazard reporting is more likely. Much of the literature on disability benefit programs has measured the elasticity of non-labor force participation for amounts of disability benefit among older males in the US (Robert Haveman and Barbara Wolfe 1990) , and more recently in Canada (Jonathan Gruber 2000) . Studies tend to find a negative effect of disability benefits on labor supply, but estimates of the magnitude of the effect vary greatly. In a seminal paper, Michele Campolieti (2004) shows that an analysis of the disincentive effect of disability benefits is problematic since it may reflect other factors of disability policy such as the screening stringency of the program. In Canada, during a period with high screening stringency in the early 1970s, Campolieti (2004) finds no large increase in non-employment for older men following a large benefit increase, while Gruber (2000) finds a large effect during a period of low stringency in the late 1980s. In the US, David Autor and Mark Duggan (2003) suggest that looser screening requirements since 1984, combined with more generous benefits, may have made disability benefits application and recipiency rates more responsive to labor demand shocks and thus contributed to a lower unemployment rate. Jonathan Gruber and Jeffrey Kubik (1997) directly estimate the effects of changes in program stringency on nonparticipation and find an elasticity of nonparticipation to denial rates in the range of 0.12-0.17. Research is needed on how changes in disability screening stringency may affect labor supply in developing countries with high unemployment and growing disability programs such as South Africa. Based on the literature on disability screening and labor supply, I expect to find that looser disability screening in some provinces of South Africa since 2002 has led to a lower probability of labor force participation among older individuals. . In order to qualify for the DG, an applicant must be "owing to his or her physical or mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, employment, or profession the means needed to enable him or her to provide for his or her maintenance" (Government of South Africa 2004). Applicants must be aged 18 to 64 for males and 18 to 59 for females. In addition, the DG is a non-contributory means tested program and benefits are granted on a temporary or permanent basis. The DG benefit amount is the same as for the old age pension and is substantial: it amounted to R940 per month in 2008, which is about twice the per capita income. A large majority of DG beneficiaries are Africans, which are the focus of this paper. Unlike in developed countries where disability beneficiaries are more often males, in South Africa, males and females are about as equally likely to be on disability. This paper therefore covers both males and females.
The recent growth of the DG program has led to a growing concern in media and political circles that DG benefits have contributed to create work disincentives and a culture of dependency. While there has been careful research on the behavioral effects of the Old Age Pension, and in particular on its effect on the labor force activity of the working age population (e.g., Cally Ardington; Anne Case and Victoria Hosegood 2008) Increased leniency in DG disability assessments in most provinces since 2002 might have contributed to the slowdown in the growth of the labor force.
I. Background on the Disability Grant Program
The I focus on the demise of the PMO as a change towards more leniency in disability screening.
This policy change provides a unique opportunity to assess the impact of the DG program on labor supply. Based on a difference-in-differences estimator, I compare non-labor force participation for older individuals in Northern Cape, the province which did not make any change to its disability screening, to the three provinces which did away with the PMO but retained physicians as disability assessors (Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Gauteng). strategy a difference-in-differences estimator using a logistic regression of the form:
4 Among other provinces, four provinces adopted assessment panels (KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West), and one province, Free State, used panels and physicians in parallel in different districts. 5 The LFS is a panel survey of dwelling units: it was not set up in such a way that individuals can be followed over time. For the panel starting in September 2001, Statistics South Africa constructed a longitudinal file at the individual level, called the 2006 LFS panel. However, sample sizes for our groups of interest at the province level were too small for it to be used in this analysis.
where NP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for nonparticipation and zero otherwise for individual i, X is a vector containing controls for observable characteristics (age, marital status, urban area, and educational attainment), the province level unemployment and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates for males, a dummy for year 2001, and two province dummies for Western Cape and Eastern Cape. Treat is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the treatment provinces and zero otherwise. Post takes the value of one for the year after the reduction in stringency. The coefficient of interest is 4 β , the interaction between Post and Treat.
The coefficient estimate on this interaction term captures the change in nonparticipation in the treatment provinces, where disability screening became more lenient in December 2001, relative to the change in nonparticipation in the control province (Northern Cape), where there was no change in the disability screening process. The key identification assumption of (1) Province specific trends over the study period are controlled for through province level annual unemployment and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates 7 . Another possible concern is that the policy change in the treatment provinces might have responded to a downward trend in labor supply in treatment provinces relative to Northern Cape, and the policy was adopted to respond to this trend 8 . I run model (1) Table 1 gives unadjusted estimates of the policy effect by gender. In panel A, for older males in treatment provinces, non-labor force participation increased by a statistically significant 4.4 percentage points. There was a drop in non-labor force participation for the control province, but it is not statistically different from zero. The unadjusted difference-in-differences estimate for older males is a (significant) 9.2 percent relative increase in the non-labor force participation rate based on the broad labor force definition. In panel B, for older women in treatment provinces, there is a relative decrease in non-labor force participation of 2 percent that is not statistically different from zero. I proceed to assess whether the relative increase in non-labor force participation for males in treatment provinces holds in a regression framework as per equation
(1). Table 2 presents estimates of the interaction term between treatment and post for the probability of non-labor force participation for all males and sub-samples. In Table 2 , column
(1), for all males, the coefficient of interest is positive and significantly different from zero, with a marginal effect of 8.6 percent. This suggests that less intensive disability screening might have led individuals to leave the broad labor force. In the second and third row, I run the same regression on sub-samples of males with an educational attainment of grade seven or less and those aged 55 to 64. As expected, coefficients are larger for these sub-samples. Although DG receipt and unemployment are high in rural areas, the regression could not be run separately for rural and urban sub-samples due to the small size of the rural sub-sample in the control group and concern over the quality of the identification of rural/urban areas in the LFS (Statistics South Africa 2004). In columns (2) and (3), the same regression is run for two other labor market outcomes, nonparticipation in the narrow labor force and non-employment. The coefficient of interest is consistently positive but not significantly different from zero. Together, these findings on broad/narrow non-labor force participation and non-employment suggest that following the reform in disability screening in treatment provinces, discouraged workers might have dropped out of the broad labor force, but employed and job seeking older males might not have significantly altered their behavior.
IV. Conclusion
I exploit a natural experiment to estimate the impact of a change in disability screening stringency on labor force outcomes for older individuals in South Africa. Results differ across labor market outcomes and by gender. I provide initial evidence that reduced stringency in DG screening in treatment provinces might not have affected the labor market behavior of older females but might have led to a reduction in the participation of older males in the broad labor force. This result highlights the possibility that in the context of Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Gauteng, the reduced stringency of the DG program might have made discouraged male workers more likely to stop wanting work and drop out of the broad labor force. However, this study suffers from the inability to fully control for contemporaneous labor market changes. It also cannot provide a separate analysis for rural areas, where DG receipt and unemployment are high.
The estimates presented in this article therefore cannot provide a definitive conclusion on the labor supply effects of the DG program. Further research is needed on the labor supply effects of disability programs in the context of high unemployment and poverty in developing countries. In South Africa, better data is needed in order to allow researchers to separate rural and urban areas and to follow individuals over time. The decision by Cabinet in August 2007 to harmonize the DG disability assessment at the national level may provide an opportunity for a reverse experiment. Other effects of the DG program also need to be evaluated, such as its poverty reduction and disability targeting effectiveness.
